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Abstract
This paper introduces three notions of perfect equilibrium for games with many players,
respectively, in behavioral, mixed and pure strategies. The equivalence between behavioral
strategy perfect equilibrium and mixed strategy perfect equilibrium is established. More
importantly, it is shown that after the resolution of strategic uncertainty, a mixed strat-
egy perfect equilibrium leads to a pure strategy perfect equilibrium almost surely. Various
properties related to limit admissibility are also considered.
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1 Introduction
Selten (1975) introduces (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium to restrict the set of Nash equilib-
ria in finite games (i.e., games with finite players and finite actions). This refinement precludes
weakly dominated actions by requiring some notion of neighborhood robustness to small per-
turbations of the original game. Based on the idea, Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) formulate
perfect equilibrium in finite-player games with infinitely many actions, and showed its existence
and several properties. In the context of games with a continuum of players (hereafter large
games), Rath (1994, 1998) provides a notion of perfect equilibrium in large games with finite
actions and consequently established its existence.
Sun and Zeng (2020) consider the perfect equilibrium in large games with infinitely many
actions. Unlike Rath (1994, 1998), Sun and Zeng (2020) introduce a new notion of perfect
equilibrium to capture the essential idea of perfection by working with perturbations of societal
summaries rather than societal summaries themselves.1 To obtain the existence of pure strategy
1Whereas the notion of perfect equilibrium proposed by Rath (1994, 1998) may not be (limit) admissible (see
Section 5 in Rath (1998)), the notion of perfect equilibrium in Sun and Zeng (2020) forces almost all the players
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perfect equilibria, Sun and Zeng (2020) turn to the nowhere equivalence condition introduced
in He et al. (2017). They show that a large game always has a pure strategy perfect equilibrium
whenever the underlying player space satisfies the nowhere equivalence condition. Furthermore,
they also establish the limit admissibility of perfect equilibria.
In the paper, we work with large games with saturated player spaces, where each player’s
payoff function continuously depends on her own action and on the societal summary induced
by other players’ actions. We present three new notions of perfect equilibrium for games with
many players. A main departure from the earlier notions of perfect equilibrium in behavioral
and pure strategies is that we also allow perturbations on the agent space, in addition to pertur-
bations of individual actions as in Rath (1994, 1998) and perturbations of societal summaries as
Sun and Zeng (2020). We also introduce mixed strategy perfect equilibrium for the first time.
We prove the equivalence between behavioral/randomized strategy perfect equilibrium and
mixed strategy perfect equilibrium in that the first can be consolidated and lifted up into
the second, and that the second can be personalized to induce the first; see Theorem 1. More
importantly, we show in Theorem 2 the property of ex post perfection for mixed strategy perfect
equilibria: after the resolution of strategic uncertainty, a mixed strategy perfect equilibrium
leads to a pure strategy perfect equilibrium almost surely. Moreover, we also find the ex post
property of limit admissibility—A mixed strategy profile is limit admissible if and only if it is
ex post limit admissible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the formal definitions of
large games and Nash equilibria. In Section 3, we state behavioral strategy perfect equilibria and
related results. In Section 4, we introduce mixed strategy perfect equilibria in the framework of
Fubini extension and present the main results. The limit admissibility is discussed in Section 5.
Some technological proofs are collected in Section 6.
2 Large games and Nash equilibria
In this section, we state the formal definition of large games and Nash equilibrium. It is con-
ventional that a large (atomless) game has three basic elements: an atomless probability space
(I,I, λ) modeling the space of players,2 a compact metric space A representing the common
action set for each player, and a set of payoff functions U defined on the set A. A large game is
a measurable function from I to U , which assigns payoff functions for all the players. In a large
game, a pure strategy profile is a measurable function from I to A. We explain more details in
the following.
Let B(A) denote the Borel σ-algebra of A and letM(A) denote the set of all Borel probability
measures on
(
A,B(A)
)
. Notice that the space M(A) (with the Prokhorov metric) is also a
to choose (limit) admissible actions via incorporating perturbations of societal summaries.
2Throughout this paper, we assume that the probability space is always a complete and countably additive.
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weakly compact and convex metric space. A behavioral strategy profile (resp. pure strategy
profile) g is a measurable function from I toM(A) (resp. A). Given a behavioral strategy profile
g, we model the societal summary as its Gelfand integral
∫
I
g(i) dλ(i), which is an element in
M(A) and represents the average action distribution of all the players. Also notice that, when
g is a pure strategy profile, its Gelfand integral
∫
I
g(i) dλ(i) equals λ ◦ g−1, which is the action
distribution induced by g.
The set M(A) serves as the set of societal summaries. Each player’s payoff continuously
depends on her own action and the societal summary, i.e., a continuous function on the product
space of A and M(A). The set of all possible payoff functions is denoted by U—the set of all
continuous functions on A ×M(A). Endowed with its sup-norm topology and the resulting
Borel σ-algebra, U would be conceived as a measurable space
(
U ,B(U)
)
.
We are now ready to present the definitions of large games and pure strategy Nash equilibria:
Definition 1. A large game is a measurable function G from (I,I, λ) to U . For convenience,
each G(i) is usually rewritten as ui.
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium f∗ of G is a pure strategy profile such that for λ-almost
all i ∈ I,
ui
(
f∗(i), λ ◦ (f∗)−1
)
≥ ui
(
a, λ ◦ (f∗)−1
)
for all a ∈ A.
To guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, we introduce saturated proba-
bility spaces.
Definition 2. A probability space is said to be (essentially) countably generated if its σ-algebra
can be generated by a countable number of subsets together with the null sets; otherwise, it is
not countably generated.
A probability space (I,I, λ) is saturated if it is nowhere countably generated in the sense
that for any subset S ∈ I with λ(S) > 0, the restricted probability space (S,IS , λS) is not
countably generated, where IS := {S ∩ S′ | S′ ∈ I} and λS is the probability measure rescaled
from the restriction of λ to IS.
Keisler and Sun (2009) show that a saturated player space is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria—every large game from (I,I, λ)
to U has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if (I,I, λ) is a saturated probability space.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the player space is always saturated.
Although each large game with a saturated player space has a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium, there exist some large games that have “bad” Nash equilibria.
Example 1. We consider a large number of smartphone sellers in a market. We identify the
agent space with a saturated probability (I,I, λ). Each seller has three options: selling high-
quality smartphones (action a), selling regular smartphones (action b), and selling low-quality
smartphones (action c).
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For each seller i, if he sells regular smartphones, his payoff is normalized to 0; If he chooses
to sell low-quality smartphones, then his payoff is −τ(b), where τ(b) is the proportion of sellers
who sell regular smartphones. That is, the payoff of a seller who sells low-quality smartphones
decreases if more sellers sell regular smartphones, and the payoff for selling low-quality smart-
phones is less than the payoff for selling the regular smartphones. If a seller chooses to sell
high-quality smartphones, then his payoff is assumed to be τ(b) − 13 . This payoff function is
reasonable since the payoff for selling high-quality smartphones will be higher if more sellers sell
regular ones, and a seller has incentive to sell high-quality smartphones (compared with regular
ones) only if more than 13 of the sellers sell regular ones.
In summary, the payoff functions in this game are as follows:
ui(a, τ) = τ(b)−
1
3 , ui(b, τ) = 0, ui(c, τ) = −τ(b),
for each player i ∈ I.
It is easy to check that the strategy profile f(i) ≡ c is a Nash equilibrium: in this case, τ(b)
is zero and hence c is one of the best choices for each player. However, this Nash equilibrium is
a “bad” equilibrium since each seller sells low-quality smartphones, and there is neither regular
smartphones nor high-quality smartphones in this market.
3 Behavioral strategy perfect equilibria
To address the problems mentioned in the previous section, we consider the concept of perfect
equilibrium, which is a refinement of notion of Nash equilibrium.
A behavioral strategy profile h : I → M(A) is fully supported if for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the
probability measure h(i) assigns strictly positive probability to every nonempty open subset of
A. This notion is used to capture the idea that every player may “tremble” and play any one
of her actions.
Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) introduce the strong metric ρs and weak metric ρw to mea-
sure the distance between behavioral strategies for finite-player game with infinitely many ac-
tions. Given two probability measures µ and ν on A, ρs and ρw are defined as follows:
ρs(µ, ν) = sup
{
|µ(B)− ν(B)|
∣∣∣ B ∈ B(A)},
ρw(µ, ν) = inf
{
ε > 0
∣∣∣ for all B ∈ B(A), µ(B) ≤ ν(Bε) + ε and ν(B) ≤ µ(Bε) + ε},
where Bε is the ε-neighborhood of the Borel measurable set B.
We follow the definitions of ε-perfect equilibrium and the perfect equilibrium in Sun and Zeng
(2020), which involve societal perturbations. Given a societal summary τ , the perturbed societal
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summary, denoted by τˆ , is a full-support probability measure on M(A). Let Bri(τˆ) denote the
set of player i’s best responses:
Bri(τˆ) = argmax
a∈A
ui(a, τˆ ) := argmax
a∈A
∫
M(A)
ui(a, τ
′) dτˆ(τ ′).
Since M(A) is weakly compact and ui is continuous, hence Bri(τˆ ) is nonempty.
Definition 3. A behavioral strategy profile with full support hε is said to be a strong ε-perfect
equilibrium if there exists a set of players Iε ⊆ I with λ(Iε) > 1 − ε and a perturbed societal
summary
∫̂
hε with at least (1 − ε)-weight on
∫
hε such that for λ-almost all i ∈ Iε,
ρs
(
hε(i),M
(
Bri(
∫̂
hε)
))
:= inf
µ∈M
(
Bri(
∫̂
hε)
) ρs(hε(i), µ) < ε,
where
∫
hε is the abbreviation of the societal summary
∫
I
hε(i) dλ(i).
A weak ε-perfect equilibrium is defined similarly by replacing the strong metric ρs with the
weak metric ρw.
Then we can define the behavioral strategy strong/weak perfect equilibrium. We use Z+ to
denote the set of positive integers. The limits taken in M(A) are respect to the usual weak
convergence.
Definition 4. A behavioral (resp. pure) strategy profile h is said to be a behavioral strategy
strong perfect equilibrium if there exists a sequence of behavioral strategy profiles {hn}n∈Z+ and
a sequence of positive constants {εn}n∈Z+ such that
(1) each hn is a strong εn-perfect equilibrium with εn → 0 as n goes to infinity,
(2) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, there exists a subsequence {hnk}∞k=1 (each h
nk is associated with Ink)
such that i ∈ ∩∞k=1Ink and lim
k→∞
hnk(i) = h(i),
(3) lim
n→∞
∫
I
hn(i) dλ(i) =
∫
I
h(i) dλ(i).
A behavioral/pure strategy weak perfect equilibrium is defined similarly by replacing “each hn
is a strong εn-perfect equilibrium” with “each h
n is a weak εn-perfect equilibrium” in Condition
(1).
Notice that the definitions above are less demanding than those in Sun and Zeng (2020) that
require Iε = I or Ink = I. It is easy to see that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we will see that this modification will not affect the main
results in Sun and Zeng (2020), including the existence and limit admissibility of pure strategy
perfect equilibria.
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In games with a finite number of players, the perfect equilibrium is defined as a pointwise
limit of a sequence of ε-perfect equilibria; see Selten (1975) and Simon and Stinchcombe (1995).
However, in large games, the pointwise convergence may break down; see Rath (1994). So we
have to weaken it: we require a perfect equilibrium to be a limit point of strategies for almost
all players as in Condition (2). The requirement that
∫
I
hn(i) dλ(i) converges to
∫
I
h(i) dλ(i)
can avoid the case where the limit of ε-best responses is not a best response in the limit; see
Rath (1994) for more details.
Khan et al. (1997) provide an example illustrating that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
may not exist if the player space is not saturated. Clearly, a pure strategy perfect equilibrium
in that example does not exist either since a perfect equilibrium is always a Nash equilib-
rium. Sun and Zeng (2020) systematically study the existence issue of the pure strategy perfect
equilibria in large games. They prove that the nowhere equivalence condition, introduced in
He et al. (2017), is sufficient and necessary to guarantee the existence. Given a large game G
with a saturated player space (I,I, λ), we let G denote the σ-algebra of I that is induced by
G. Since the action space A is compact, the space of payoff functions U is polish, and hence
G is countably generated. Therefore, I is nowhere equivalent to G and a pure strategy perfect
equilibrium exists. Such a result is summarized as follows:
Proposition 1. Let (I,I, λ) be an atomless saturated probability space. Then every large game
G : (I,I, λ)→ U has a pure strategy strong/weak perfect equilibrium.
We revisit the example in Section 2. Although proposition above insures the existence of
pure strategy perfect equilibria, it is not easy to identify a pure strategy perfect equilibrium.
Nevertheless, we can identify a behavioral/randomized strategy perfect equilibrium in the fol-
lowing.
For each ε > 0, we consider a strategy profile f ε(i) ≡ (23−ε)δa+
1
3δb+εδc. Let the perturbed
societal summary be τˆ = (1−ε)δτ+εη, where η is the uniform distribution. Thus, it can be easily
verified that f ε is an ε-perfect equilibrium. As ε goes to zero, f ε converges to f(i) ≡ 23δa+
1
3δb.
Therefore, we obtain a behavioral/randomized strategy perfect equilibrium f(i) ≡ 23δa +
1
3δb.
To get a pure strategy perfect equilibrium by purifying a behavioral/randomized strategy
perfect equilibrium f , we have to introduce the notion of mixed strategy perfect equilibria.
4 Mixed strategy perfect equilibria
4.1 Fubini extension
In this section, we introduce the mixed strategy perfect equilibria of large games. The mixed
strategy profile in large games is first introduced in Khan et al. (2015).
As a mixed strategy profile requires the randomization to be independent across agents,
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it leads to a process with a continuum of independent random variables in the setting of a
continuum of agents. In order to resolve the measurability issues3 of these processes and to
guarantee the existence of these processes with a variety of distributions, we adopt the framework
of a rich Fubini extension as in Sun (2006).
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space that captures all the uncertainty associated with the indi-
vidual randomization for the agents in a mixed allocation or a mixed strategy profile. Through-
out the rest of this section, we will assume that the agent space (I,I, λ) together with the sample
space (Ω,F ,P) allows a rich Fubini extension.4 Recall that a Fubini extension (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P)
is a probability space that extends the usual product space of the agent space (I,I, λ) and a
sample space (Ω,F ,P), and retains the Fubini property. Such a Fubini extension is rich if there
is a I⊠F-measurable process F from I×Ω to [0, 1] such that the random variables Fi(·) = F (i, ·)
are independent and have the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. A process F from a Fubini exten-
sion (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P) to a Polish space X is said to be essentially pairwise independent if
for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the random variables Fi and Fj are independent for λ-almost all j ∈ I.
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Definition 5. A probability space (I × Ω,W,Q) is said to be a Fubini extension of the usual
product probability space (I × Ω,I ⊗ F , λ ⊗ P) if for any real-valued Q-integrable function F
on (I × Ω,W), the following statements hold:
(1) The function Fi is P-integrable on (Ω,F ,P) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, and Fω is λ-integrable
on (I,I, λ) for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω;
(2) The integrals
∫
Ω Fi dP and
∫
T
Fω dλ are integrable on (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F ,P), respectively.
In addition,
∫
I×Ω F dQ =
∫
I
(
∫
Ω Fi dP) dλ =
∫
Ω(
∫
I
Fω dλ) dP.
A Fubini extension (I × Ω,W,Q) is said to be rich if there is a W-measurable process G from
(I × Ω) to the interval [0, 1] such that G is essentially pairwise independent, and Gi induces
the uniform distribution on [0, 1] for λ-almost all i ∈ I. Notice that the marginal probability
measure of Q on (I,I) and (Ω,F) are λ and P, respectively. Thus, we denote the Fubini
extension (I × Ω,W,Q) by (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ⊠ P).
We connect the saturation property of a probability space to the existence of a rich Fubini
extension. The following result is from (Sun, 2006, Proposition 4.2) and (Podczeck, 2010,
Theorem 1).
3See Sun (2006) for more details. See also Khan et al. (2015) for a discussion of the issues in modeling
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in a large game.
4The usual Lebesgue unit interval, as an agent space, can be extended to allow a rich Fubini extension; see
Sun and Zhang (2009), and more generally Podczeck (2010). Also note that a rich Fubini extension is called a
rich product probability space in Sun (2006).
5Given that (I, I, λ) is an atomless (complete) probability space, a single point (and thus up to countably many
points) has a measure zero, and thus, essential pairwise independence is more general than the usual pairwise
and mutual independence.
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Fact 1. The probability space (I,I, λ) is saturated if and only if there is a rich Fubini extension
based on it.
The rich Fubini extension plays an important role in large games as one can construct
processes on it with essentially pairwise independent random variables that have any given
variety of distributions on a general polish space. The following result is taken from (Sun, 2006,
Proposition 5.3).
Fact 2. Let (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P) be a rich Fubini extension, let X be a Polish space, and let
h be a measurable mapping from (I,I, λ) to M(X). Then there exists an I ⊠ F-measurable
process F : I × Ω → X such that the process F is essentially pairwise independent and h(i) is
the induced distribution by Fi for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
This proposition reveals the fact that unlike the Lebesgue unit interval, saturated probability
spaces are hospitable to independence and measurability, moreover, this proposition guarantees
that every behavioral strategy profile can be lifted to a measurable process defined in a Fubini
extension space.
Now, we are able to define a mixed strategy profile of a large game. From now on, we use
the Fubini extension as the framework to ensure that almost any two players play independent
mixed strategies in a non-cooperative setting. Let (I,I, λ) be a saturated probability space and
let (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ⊠ P) be a rich Fubini extension of the product space (I × Ω,I ⊗ F , λ⊗ P).
Definition 6. A mixed strategy profile of a large game G : I → U is an I ⊠ F−measurable
function g : I × Ω→ A, where the process g is assumed to be essentially pairwise independent.
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G is a mixed strategy profile g∗, such that for λ-almost
all i ∈ I, ∫
Ω
ui
(
g∗i (ω), λ ◦ (g
∗
ω)
−1
)
dP ≥
∫
Ω
ui
(
η(ω), λ ◦ (g∗ω)
−1
)
dP
for any random variable η from (Ω,F ,P) to A.
The above definition of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for a large game was firstly proposed
in Khan et al. (2015), and they also demonstrated that there is a one to one correspondence
between the behavioral strategy Nash equilibrium and the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for
large games.
The next result ia taken from Corollary 2.9 of Sun (2006), which is a version of the ELLN in
the framework of Fubini extension. It will be necessary when we turn to inquire the relationship
between a behavioral strategy perfect equilibrium and a mixed strategy perfect equilibrium.
Fact 3. Assume that (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P) is a Fubini extension. If F is an essentially pairwise
independent and I ⊠F-measurable process, then the sample distribution λ ◦ (Fω)
−1 is the same
as the distribution (λ⊠ P) ◦ F−1 for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
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4.2 Mixed strategy perfect equilibria
We are now ready to define the notion of mixed strategy perfect equilibria as we have developed
the necessary background to do so. Given a mixed strategy profile g : I × Ω → A, let Bri(gˆ)
denote player i’s best responses, i.e.,
Bri(gˆ) = argmax
a∈A
∫
Ω
ui
(
a, λ̂ ◦ g−1ω
)
dP,
where λ̂ ◦ g−1ω is a perturbed societal summary6 of λ ◦ g−1ω such that λ̂ ◦ g
−1
ω has at least (1− ε)-
weight on λ ◦ g−1ω .
It is a straightforward observation that Bri(gˆ) is nonempty due to the continuity of ui and
the compactness of A. We can now turn to the definitions of mixed strategy (strong/weak)
ε-perfect equilibria and mixed strategy (strong/weak) perfect equilibria.
Definition 7. Amixed strategy strong ε-perfect equilibrium is a mixed strategy profile g : I×Ω→
A, such that for almost all i ∈ I, P ◦ g−1i is fully supported, and there exists a set of players
Iε ⊆ I, such that λ(Iε) > 1− ε and for λ-almost all i ∈ Iε,
ρs
(
P ◦ g−1i ,M
(
Bri(gˆ)
))
:= inf
µ∈M
(
Bri(gˆ)
) ρs(P ◦ g−1i , µ) < ε,
A mixed strategy weak ε-perfect equilibrium is defined similarly by replacing the strong metric
ρs with the weak metric ρw.
The above notion of mixed ε-perfect equilibria is modified from the notion of behavioral
ε-perfect equilibria. For a particular player i, the induced probability distribution P ◦ g−1i is the
induced behavioral strategy for player i. Thus, a mixed perfect equilibrium should be a limit of
a sequence of mixed ε-perfect equilibria:
Definition 8. A mixed strategy profile g : I × Ω → A is said to be a mixed strategy strong
perfect equilibrium if there exists a sequence of mixed strategy profiles {gn}n∈Z+ and a sequence
of positive constants {εn}n∈Z+ such that
(1) each gn is a strong εn-perfect equilibrium with εn → 0 as n goes to infinity,
(2) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, there exists a subsequence {gnk}∞k=1 (each g
nk is associated with Ink)
such that i ∈ ∩∞k=1Ink and lim
k→∞
P ◦ (gnki )
−1 = P ◦ g−1i ,
(3) lim
n→∞
∫
I
P ◦ (gni )
−1 dλ(i) =
∫
I
P ◦ g−1i dλ(i).
6To make sure that Bri(gˆ) is well defined, the perturbation λ̂ ◦ g
−1
ω should be measurable as a function of ω.
Throughout the rest of this paper, the perturbation is always assumed to be measurable.
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A mixed strategy weak perfect equilibrium is defined similarly by replacing “each hn is a
strong εn-perfect equilibrium” with “each h
n is a weak εn-perfect equilibrium” in Condition (1).
We are now ready to show the relationship between a behavioral strategy (strong/weak)
perfect equilibrium and a mixed strategy (strong/weak) perfect equilibrium. The theorem below
is one of the main theorem in this paper. It establishes a one to one correspondence between
behavioral strategy (strong/weak) perfect equilibria and mixed strategy (strong/weak) perfect
equilibria.
Theorem 1. The following equivalence holds for a large game G : I → U : (i) Every mixed
strategy strong (resp. weak) perfect equilibrium induces a behavioral strategy strong (resp. weak)
perfect equilibrium and (ii) every behavioral strategy strong (resp. weak) perfect equilibrium can
be lifted to a mixed strategy strong (resp. weak) perfect equilibrium.7
This theorem suggests that the Fubini extension is an appropriate framework to define the
mixed strategy perfect equilibrium and within the Fubini framework, the mixed strategy perfect
equilibrium can be naturally connected with the behavioral strategy perfect equilibrium. The
proof is in the Appendix and the ELLN plays a crucial role in the proof. As a corollary, we can
show the existence of mixed strategy strong perfect equilibrium as a combination of Theorem 1
and the existence of behavioral strategy perfect equilibrium.
Corollary 1. If (I,I, λ) is a saturated probability space, then there exists a mixed strategy
strong perfect equilibrium.
The proof is quite straightforward as the saturation guarantees the existence of behavioral
strategy strong perfect equilibrium, then by Theorem 1, it can be lifted to a mixed strategy
strong perfect equilibrium.
4.3 Mixed and pure perfect equilibria: An ex post relationship
In this subsection, we discuss the relationship between a mixed strategy perfect equilibrium and
its induced pure strategy perfect equilibrium in the realized ex post game. We present a novel
result about mixed strategy perfect equilibria: after the resolution of strategic uncertainty, a
mixed strategy perfect equilibrium leads to a pure strategy perfect equilibrium almost surely.
A rich literature has developed on equilibrium notions involving the ex post concept. In
the context of large games, Khan et al. (2015) defines the notion of mixed strategy equilibrium
and systematically studies the relationship between a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and each
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ex post game. They prove that every mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium has the ex post Nash property. In this subsection, we try to establish a much more
interesting result: every mixed strategy perfect equilibrium has the ex post perfect property.
7Although we have not formally define the words “induce” and “lift”, their meaning is clear from the proofs.
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Since a mixed strategy profile g : I × Ω → A is defined as an I ⊠ F-measurable function
where g is also assumed to be essentially pairwise independent, hence, it is easy to see that gω
is a pure strategy profile for any realized sample ω. In the below theorem, we show that this
induced pure strategy profile gω, for almost all ω, is a pure strategy perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 2. A mixed strategy strong (resp. weak) perfect equilibrium g of a large game G : I →
U has the ex post perfection property: for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω, gω is a pure strategy strong (resp.
weak) perfect equilibrium.
The proof is in the Appendix and the intuition behind the proof is simple. The ELLN
together with the Fubini property guarantee that the induced pure strategy profile gω is the
“limit” of a sequence of ε-perfect equilibrium. So rather than the proof, it is the interpretation
of Theorem 2 that is of interest. This Theorem rigorously develops the intuition that once
uncertainty is resolved, a player has no incentive to depart ex post from his strategy taken
in the ex ante game when he finds himself in the realized ex post game. We have shown
that a mixed strategy perfect equilibrium has an ex post purification, and therefore, implies the
existence of pure strategy perfect equilibrium, so this gives an immediate proof of Proposition 1.
So Theorem 2 shows that in large games, the notion of mixed strategy perfect equilibrium is
redundant as one can construct a pure strategy perfect equilibrium if given a mixed strategy
perfect equilibrium.
As a direct application, we are now able to give a pure-strategy perfect equilibrium in the
smartphone sells game. Based on the discuss at the end of Section 3, we have a (randomized)
behavioral strategy perfect equilibrium f(i) ≡ 23δa+
1
3δb. Thus by Theorem 1, f can be lifted to
a mixed strategy perfect equilibrium g. Finally, by Theorem 2, we can obtain a pure-strategy
perfect equilibrium gω for almost all ω ∈ Ω. Moreover, by using the ELLN, we can conclude that
in perfect equilibrium gω,
2
3 of the players choose a (sell good smartphone), and
1
3 of the players
choose b (sell regular smartphone). This result coincides with the real smartphone markets in
most countries.
As a corollary, the below result shows that a mixed-strategy weak perfect equilibrium is a
mixed Nash equilibrium. This result is compatible with the fact that the perfect equilibrium is
a refinement of Nash equilibria in games with finite players.
Corollary 2. In any large game, a mixed strategy weak perfect equilibrium is a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium.
The proof is divided into two steps. In Step 1, suppose g : I × Ω → A is a mixed-strategy
weak perfect equilibrium, then by Theorem 2, for almost all ω ∈ Ω, the induced pure strategy
profile gω is a pure strategy weak perfect equilibrium; In Step 2, by the (Sun and Zeng, 2020,
Proposition 1), gω is a Nash equilibrium for almost all ω ∈ Ω, and hence, g itself is a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium as it has the ex post Nash property ((Khan et al., 2015, Theorem
2)).
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5 Limit admissibility
In this section, we will study the limit admissibility of mixed strategy perfect equilibria. For
games with finite players and finite actions, it is well known that perfect equilibria form a
nonempty set of Nash equilibria that are admissible, which means that they put no mass on
weakly dominated actions. Below we start with the definition of weakly dominated strategy for
large games.
Definition 9. For each i ∈ I, a pure strategy ai ∈ A is said to be a weakly dominated strategy
for player i if there exists a behavioral strategy µi ∈ M(A) such that
(1) ui(ai, τ) ≤ ui(µi, τ) for each τ ∈ M(A),
(2) ui(ai, τ
′) < ui(µi, τ
′) for some τ ′ ∈ M(A),
where ui(µi, τ) =
∫
A
ui(ai, τ) dµi(a).
For each i ∈ I, let Θi be the set of weakly dominated strategies for player i. Then we can
state the formal definition of admissible strategy.
Definition 10. A strategy profile f : I → A is said to be admissible if for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
f(i) ∈ Θci , where Θ
c
i is the complement of the set Θi.
For games with finite players and finite actions, it is easy to verify that each pure strategy
perfect equilibrium is admissible; however, For finite-player games with infinitely many actions,
Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) showed that there exists a game that has a unique Nash equilib-
rium in weakly dominated strategies; see Example 2.1 therein. Moving on to the context of large
games, Sun and Zeng (2020) provide an example of a large game with infinitely many actions,
in which the unique strong perfect equilibrium is not admissible. These examples suggest that
the admissibility and the existence of perfect equilibrium may not be compatible in games with
infinitely many actions.
To solve this incompatibility problem, Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) introduced a weaker
property called the limit admissibility that is compatible with the existence: a strategy is limit
admissible if it puts no mass on the interior of the set of weakly dominated strategies.
For a player who has finitely many actions, a limit admissible strategy is indeed an admissible
strategy, therefore, for finite-player game with finite actions, every perfect equilibrium is limit
admissible. For finite-player game with infinitely many actions, Simon and Stinchcombe (1995)
showed that every perfect equilibrium is limit admissible. In the framework of the large game,
Sun and Zeng (2020) proved that every pure strategy weak/strong perfect equilibrium is limit
admissible.8 Below we will show that every mixed strategy perfect equilibrium is also limit
admissible. We begin with the definition of limit admissibility for mixed strategy profile.
8Their result can be easily generalized to every behavioral strategy weak/strong perfect equilibrium.
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Definition 11. A mixed strategy profile g is said to be limit admissible if for λ−almost all
i ∈ I, P ◦ g−1i (Θ
o
i ) = 0, where Θ
o
i is the topological interior of the set Θi. A pure strategy
profile h is said to be limit admissible if for λ-almost all i ∈ I, h(i) ∈ (Θoi )
c, where (Θoi )
c is the
complement of Θoi .
For each i ∈ I, each action in (Θoi )
c is called a limit admissible action of player i, where
(Θoi )
c is the complement of Θoi .
The following result shows that each mixed strategy weak perfect equilibrium is limit ad-
missible. Since a strong perfect equilibrium is also a weak perfect equilibrium, the same result
holds for every mixed strategy strong perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Every mixed-strategy weak perfect equilibrium is limit admissible.
We conclude this section with an interesting theorem: we can prove that a strategy profile
is limit admissible if and only if it is ex post limit admissible.
Theorem 4. A mixed-strategy profile g of a large game is limit admissible if and only if it is
ex post limit admissible: for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω, the pure strategy gω is limit admissible.
As an application of the Theorem 4, we can strengthen the main result of Khan et al. (2015):
a mixed strategy profile of a large game is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is ex post Nash.
By using our Theorem 4, we can see that a mixed strategy profile is a limit admissible Nash
equilibrium if and only if it is ex post limit admissible Nash.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of results in Section 4
Proof of Theorem 1. We focus on the case of strong perfect equilibrium, the case of weak perfect
equilibrium can be proved similarly.
Step 1. Suppose that g is a mixed strategy strong perfect equilibrium of game G. Let h(i) =
P ◦ g−1i . We want to show that h is a behavioral strategy strong perfect equilibrium.
By definition, there exists a sequence of mixed strategy profiles {gn}n∈Z+ and a sequence of
positive constants {εn}n∈Z+ such that
(1) each gn is a strong εn-perfect equilibrium with εn → 0 as n goes to infinity,
(2) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, there exists a subsequence {gnk}∞k=1 (each g
nk is associated with Ink)
such that i ∈ ∩∞k=1Ink and lim
k→∞
P ◦ (gnki )
−1 = P ◦ g−1i ,
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(3) lim
n→∞
∫
I
P ◦ (gni )
−1 dλ(i) =
∫
I
P ◦ g−1i dλ(i).
Define hn(i) = P◦(gni )
−1, we claim that hn is a behavioral strategy strong εn-perfect equilibrium.
By the ELLN in Fact 3, it is clear that for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω,
∫
I
hn(i) dλ(i) =
∫
I
P ◦ (gni )
−1 dλ(i) = λ ◦ (gnω)
−1,
which implies that
λ ◦ (gnω)
−1
∧
=
∫
I
hn(i) dλ(i)
∧
,
holds for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Therefore, we have that
Bri(gˆn) = argmax
a∈A
∫
Ω
ui
(
a, λ ◦ (gnω)
−1
∧)
dP = argmax
a∈A
∫
Ω
ui
(
a,
∫
I
hn(i) dλ
∧)
dP = Bri(
∫̂
I
hn).
Hence by the definition of gn, we can derive that for λ-almost all i ∈ In,
ρs
(
P ◦ (gni )
−1,M
(
Bri(gˆn)
))
= ρs
(
hn(i),M
(
Bri(
∫̂
I
hn)
))
< εn.
Since hn is fully supported by construction, hence hn is a strong εn-perfect equilibrium.
To prove that h is a behavioral strategy strong perfect equilibrium, we need to verify the
following two conditions:
(1’) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, there exists a subsequence {hnk}∞k=1 (each h
nk is associated with Ink)
such that i ∈ ∩∞k=1Ink and lim
k→∞
hnk(i) = h(i),
(2’) lim
n→∞
∫
I
hn(i) dλ(i) =
∫
I
h(i) dλ(i).
By definition, these two conditions can be derived from (2) and (3) directly. Therefore, h is
a behavioral strategy strong perfect equilibrium.
Step 2. Now suppose h is a behavioral strategy strong perfect equilibrium. By definition, there
exists a sequence of behavioral strategy profiles {hn}n∈Z+ and a sequence of positive constants
{εn}n∈Z+ such that
(1) each hn is a strong εn-perfect equilibrium with εn → 0 as n goes to infinity,
(2) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, there exists a subsequence {hnk}∞k=1 (each h
nk is associated with Ink)
such that i ∈ ∩∞k=1Ink and lim
k→∞
hnk(i) = h(i),
(3) lim
n→∞
∫
I
hn(i) dλ(i) =
∫
I
h(i) dλ(i).
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Since {hn}∞n=1 and h are measurable functions from I to M(A), thus given that (I ×Ω,I ⊠
F , λ⊠ P) is a rich Fubini extension, by Fact 2, there exist I ⊠F-measurable functions {gn}∞n=1
and g from I × Ω to A such that gn and g are essentially pairwise independent functions and
for λ-almost all i ∈ I:
P ◦ (gni )
−1 = hn(i) and P ◦ (gi)
−1 = h(i).
In addition, we can assume {gni }
∞
n=1 : Ω→ A are independent.
Therefore, similar to the proof of Step 1, we can apply the ELLN to obtain that:
Bri(gˆn) = Bri(
∫̂
I
hn),
which implies that gn is a mixed strategy strong εn-perfect equilibrium for each n ∈ Z+. The
remaining proof is the same as the proof of Step 1 and hence g is a mixed strategy strong perfect
equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2. We focus on the case of weak perfect equilibrium, the case of strong perfect
equilibrium can be proved similarly. Suppose that g is a mixed strategy weak perfect equilibrium.
We shall show that g has the ex post perfection property, i.e., gω is a pure strategy weak perfect
equilibrium for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
By definition, there exists a sequence of mixed strategy profiles {gn}n∈Z+ and a sequence of
positive constants {εn}n∈Z+ such that
(1) each gn is a weak εn-perfect equilibrium with εn → 0 as n goes to infinity,
(2) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, there exists a subsequence {gnk}∞k=1 (each g
nk is associated with Ink)
such that i ∈ ∩∞k=1Ink and lim
k→∞
P ◦ (gnki )
−1 = P ◦ g−1i ,
(3) lim
n→∞
∫
I
P ◦ (gni )
−1 dλ(i) =
∫
I
P ◦ g−1i dλ(i).
Based on Fact 2, without loss of generality, we can assume that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the
sequence of strategies {gni }
∞
n=1 : Ω→ A are independent.
To show that gω is a pure strategy weak perfect equilibrium, we will construct a sequence of
behavioral strategy profiles {fn}∞n=1, where f
n is a weak εn-perfect equilibrium for each n ∈ Z+.
Lemma 1. Let hn(i) = P ◦ (gni )
−1, then for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω, the strategy profile
fn(i) = (1− εn)δgnω(i) + εnh
n(i)
is a weak 2εn-perfect equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1. According to the proof of Theorem 1, hn(i) is a weak εn-perfect equilibrium
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and hence by the definition, for almost all i ∈ In:
ρw
(
hn(i),M
(
Bri(
∫̂
hn)
))
:= inf
µ∈M
(
Bri(
̂
∫
hn)
) ρw(hn(i), µ) < εn,
by the definition of weak measure, we have
µ(Bri(
∫̂
hn)) ≤ hn(i; Bri(
∫̂
hn)εn) + εn,
for some µ ∈ M
(
Bri(
∫̂
hn)
)
, which implies:
hn
(
i; Bri(
∫̂
hn)εn
)
≥ 1− εn,
for each i ∈ In, let C
n
i = Bri(
∫̂
hn)εn , by the ELLN, for almost all ω ∈ Ω,
λ ◦ (gnω)
−1 =
∫
I
hn(i) dλ,
therefore,
λ({i ∈ In : g
n
ω(i) ∈ C
n
i }) =
∫
In
hn(i;Cni ) dλ ≥ (1− εn)
2,
the last inequality is due to Cni = Bri(
∫̂
hn)εn and λ(In) ≥ 1−εn. Let I
′
n = {i ∈ In | g
n
ω(i) ∈ C
n
i },
then λ(I ′n) ≥ 1− 2εn. Now we can show that f
n(i) is a weak 2εn-perfect equilibrium.
It is easy to see that fn(i) has full support by its construction. And by the ELLN,
∫
I
fn(i) dλ =
∫
I
hn(i) dλ,
hence for any i ∈ I ′n,
ρw
(
fn(i),M
(
Bri(
∫̂
fn)
))
= ρw
(
(1− εn)δgnω(i) + εnh
n(i),M
(
Bri(
∫̂
hn)
))
≤ ρw
(
(1− εn)δgnω(i) + εnh
n(i), δgnω(i)
)
+ ρw
(
δgnω(i),M
(
Bri(
∫̂
hn)
))
≤ εn + εn = 2εn.
The first inequality is due to the property of a metric. The last inequality is because gnω(i) ∈
Cni = Bri(
∫̂
hn)εn . Therefore, fn(i) ia a weak 2εn-perfect equilibrium.
Go back to the proof of Theorem 2, to prove that gω(i) is a weak perfect equilibrium, we
only need to verify the following two conditions:
(1’) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, there exists a subsequence {fnk}∞k=1 (each f
nk is associated with
I ′nk) such that i ∈ ∩
∞
k=1I
′
nk
and lim
k→∞
fnk(i) = δgω(i),
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(2’) lim
n→∞
∫
I
fn(i) dλ(i) =
∫
I
δgω(i) dλ(i).
Condition (2’) is easy to be verified by using the ELLN:
lim
n→∞
∫
I
fn(i) dλ = lim
n→∞
∫
I
hn(i) dλ = lim
n→∞
∫
I
P ◦ (gni )
−1 dλ =
∫
I
P ◦ g−1i dλ =
∫
I
δgω(i) dλ.
Then we verify condition (1’). Let h(i) = P ◦ g−1i , by condition (3), we have:
lim
k→∞
hnk(i) = h(i),
where i ∈ Ink . Let Fi be a countable dense subset of the support of h(i), and one can easily
check that for almost all ω ∈ Ω, gi(ω) ∈ supph(i).
For any a ∈ Fi and m ∈ N, let θm = h(i;B 1
m
(a)) > 0, here B 1
m
(a) is an open ball centered
at a with radius 1
m
. Since lim
k→∞
hnk(i) = h(i) and hnk
(
i; Bri(
∫̂
hnk)εnk
)
≥ 1 − εnk , hence there
exist K ∈ N such that for k ≥ K,
hnk(i;B 1
m
(a) ∩ Bri(
∫̂
hnk)εnk ) > θm2 .
Since from Condition (2), {gnki }k≥K are independent, hence by the second Borel-Cantelli lemma,
we conclude that for almost all ω ∈ Ω, and for any m ∈ N,
g
nk
i (ω) ∈ B 1
m
(a) ∩ Bri(
∫̂
hnk)εnk infinitely many times.
This implies that there exists a subsequence {nkq}
∞
q=1, such that g
nkq
i (ω) → a and g
nkq
i (ω) ∈
Bri(
∫̂
hnkq )
εnkq .
Since Fi is countable and dense in supph(i), and since gi(ω) ∈ supph(i), based on the
above discussion, we can find a subsequence {nkq}
∞
q=1, such that g
nkq
i (ω)→ gi(ω) and g
nkq
i (ω) ∈
Bri(
∫̂
hnkq )
εnkq .
From g
nkq
i (ω) ∈ Bri(
∫̂
hnkq )
εnkq = C
nkq
i and the construction of I
′
n in the proof of Lemma 1
we can see that i ∈ I ′nkq . From g
nkq
i (ω)→ gi(ω) we can directly conclude that:
lim
q→∞
fnkq (i) = lim
k→∞
δ
g
nkq
ω (i)
= δgω(i).
Hence, Condition (1’) has been verified. Finally, by the Fubini property, we conclude that for
almost all ω ∈ Ω, the ex post strategy profile gω is a weak perfect equilibrium.
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6.2 Proofs of results in Section 5
Proof of Theorem 3. Let g be a mixed strategy weak perfect equilibrium. Then there exists a
sequence of mixed strategy profiles {gn}n∈Z+ and a sequence of positive constants {εn}n∈Z+
such that
(1) each gn is a strong εn-perfect equilibrium with εn → 0 as n goes to infinity,
(2) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, there exists a subsequence {gnk}∞k=1 (each g
nk is associated with Ink)
such that i ∈ ∩∞k=1Ink and lim
k→∞
P ◦ (gnki )
−1 = P ◦ g−1i ,
(3) lim
n→∞
∫
I
P ◦ (gni )
−1 dλ(i) =
∫
I
P ◦ g−1i dλ(i).
By Condition (2), P ◦ g−1i is the limit of a subsequence of {P ◦ (g
n
i )
−1}∞n=1, without lose of
generality, we can assume the subsequence is the sequence itself.
We claim that for each player i ∈ In, we have that
Θi ∩ Bri(gˆn) = ∅.
Otherwise, suppose a ∈ Θi∩Bri(gˆn). Since a ∈ Θi, there exists a behavioral strategy µi ∈ M(A)
such that a is weakly dominated by µi. Then by definition we can derive:
ui(a, λ ◦ (g
n
ω)
−1
∧
) < ui(µi, λ ◦ (g
n
ω)
−1
∧
)
holds for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω. By taking integration for ω, we have:∫
Ω
ui(a, λ ◦ (g
n
ω)
−1
∧
) dP <
∫
Ω
ui(µi, λ ◦ (g
n
ω)
−1
∧
) dP.
However, since we assume a ∈ Bri(gˆn), the following inequality holds:∫
Ω
ui(a, λ ◦ (g
n
ω)
−1
∧
) dP ≥
∫
Ω
ui(µi, λ ◦ (g
n
ω)
−1
∧
) dP.
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, we have Θi ∩ Bri(gˆn) = ∅.
For each n ∈ Z+, since g
n is a weak εn-perfect equilibrium, hence for λ-almost all i ∈ In,
ρw
(
P ◦ (gni )
−1,M
(
Bri(gˆn)
))
< εn,
which implies that:
P ◦ (gni )
−1(Bri(gˆn)
εn) > µ(Bri(gˆn))− εn = 1− εn
for some µ ∈ M(Bri(gˆn)).
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Let Bn = A− (Θci )
εn . Thus Bn is open and ∪
∞
n=1Bn = Θ
o
i .
Since Θi ∩ Bri(gˆn) = ∅, it is easy to see that:
Bri(gˆn)
εn ⊆ (Θci )
εn ⊆ (Θci )
εn .
Therefore,
P ◦ (gni )
−1
(
(Θci)
εn
)
> 1− εn
which is equivalent to
P ◦ (gni )
−1(Bn) < εn.
By definition we know B1 ⊆ B2 ⊆ B3 ⊆ · · · , hence we also have:
P ◦ (gni )
−1(Bm) < εn
where m ≤ n. Let n goes to infinity, and by the property of weakly convergence,
P ◦ g−1i (Bm) ≤ lim infn→∞
P ◦ (gni )
−1(Bm) = 0.
Therefore,
P ◦ g−1i (Θ
o
i ) = P ◦ g
−1
i (∪
∞
n=1Bn) = 0.
That is, g is limit admissible.
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose g is limit admissible, we shall prove that gω is limit admissible for
P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
By definition, we have that for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
P ◦ g−1i (Θ
o
i ) = 0,
which implies, for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω,
gi(ω) ∈ (Θ
o
i )
c.
Then, by the Fubini property of a Fubini extension, we have, for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω, for λ-almost
all i ∈ I,
gω(i) ∈ (Θ
o
i )
c.
This means, for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω, gω is limit admissible and, therefore, g has the ex post
property.
Now suppose that a mixed strategy profile g has the ex post property. This is to say, for
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P-almost all ω ∈ Ω, for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
gω(i) ∈ (Θ
o
i )
c.
Then by the Fubini property of a Fubini extension, we have, for λ-almost all i ∈ I, P-almost all
ω ∈ Ω,
gi(ω) ∈ (Θ
o
i )
c.
That is equivalent to say, for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
P ◦ g−1i (Θ
o
i ) = 0.
This verifies that g is limit admissible.
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